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Two-year-old children’s reasoning about the relation between their own and others’ preferences was
investigated across two studies. In Experiment 1, children first observed 2 actors display their individual
preferences for various toys. Children were then asked to make inferences about new, visually inacces-
sible toys and books that were described as being the favorite of each actor, unfamiliar to each actor, or
disliked by each actor. Children tended to select the favorite toys and books from the actor who shared
their own preference but chose randomly when the new items were unfamiliar to or disliked by the two
actors. Experiment 2 extended these findings, showing that children do not generalize a shared preference
across unrelated categories of items. Taken together, the results suggest that young children readily
recognize when another person holds a preference similar to their own and use that knowledge
appropriately to achieve desired outcomes.
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Effective social interaction requires an understanding that peo-
ple are individuals with mental states such as intentions and
desires, including an understanding that mental states often differ
across individuals. Further, a crucial realization is that people are
often consistent over time in mental states such as desires. This
sort of consistency within an individual is often thought of within
the framework of traits or dispositions (Trope & Higgins, 1993).
Specifically, a preference is a type of disposition causing an
individual to consistently value or desire one kind of thing over
another. In contrast, a desire is a longing or wishing for something,
which is a single, isolated mental state. For example, a desire to see
a certain film will be fulfilled as soon as one has seen it. On the
other hand, a preference for French films causes one to consis-
tently want to watch French films over time and choose them over
other types of films in many situations.
It is important to note that since traits and dispositions, such as
preferences, are relatively consistent over time, they can be used to
make inferences about others. These inferences may be particu-
larly meaningful when two individuals share a preference. For
example, one may be more willing to trust the recommendation of
someone with whom they share a preference. Thus, an important
consequence of the ability to recognize the preferences of others is
that it fosters the detection of similarities and differences between
one’s own and another person’s preferences, which can in turn
affect how one thinks about and interacts with that individual. Do
young children consider shared preferences in their interactions
with others? In the current research, we investigated 2-year-old
children’s recognition of the correspondences between their own
and others’ preferences, and their use of such information in basic
social interactions. In two studies, we examined children’s ability
to first detect a shared preference and subsequently to apply that
knowledge appropriately depending on its relevance to the task at
hand.
To begin to answer the question of whether young children can
recognize shared preferences, it is essential to first examine the
requisite social–cognitive abilities needed for this task. The rec-
ognition of others’ preferences requires the capacity to infer the
mental states of others and keep track of consistencies within an
individual over time. More specifically, children must be able to
recognize emotional reactions directed intentionally toward spe-
cific objects or events and interpret them as a person’s current
desire, even if it conflicts with the child’s own desire. They must
also be able to keep track of consistencies in an individual’s
desires over time that might be indicative of dispositional aspects
of personal preference. The ability to integrate such information is
crucial if children are to recognize when another person’s prefer-
ence is similar to their own.
Infants as young as 12 months of age show recognition of
others’ desires in that they expect people to react positively to
things they desire and to have the goal of obtaining these desired
things (Phillips, Wellman & Spelke, 2002). As children’s under-
standing of desire develops, they become increasingly capable of
recognizing when others’ desires differ from their own, an impor-
tant skill for reasoning about the subjective nature of preferences.
A decrease in egocentrism in desire understanding over the second
year of life is evidenced by children’s ability to distinguish their
own from another’s desire. Bronson (1981) found that between 12
and 24 months of age, toddlers increasingly offer toys and items on
the basis of another person’s desire or need. Further, in the latter
part of the second year, children are able to distinguish their own
desire from that of another person, offering the food item that an
individual showed liking toward, even if it was not the food that
the children themselves desired (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).
Understanding other people as individuals with characteristics
and dispositions that are consistent over time is the second major
component of the ability to reason about preferences. Since traits
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can be inferred from visible behaviors and are thought to be
underlying causes of future behavior, adults often use traits and
dispositions to explain and predict the behavior of others (Ross &
Nisbett, 1991). The studies on desire understanding described thus
far focused on behavior within a situation, rather than actions and
desires that are consistent across situations and over time. One way
that children might initially learn about dispositions and their
predictive value is by observing consistencies in behavior within
an individual over time and also differences in behavior across
individuals.
Evidence for children’s earliest understanding of individual
dispositions comes from studies that examine their expectations
regarding the movements of animated agents engaging in helping
or hindering behaviors (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Ku-
hlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; Premack & Premack, 1997).
Twelve-month-old infants seem to perceive helping actions as
consistent with other positively valenced behaviors, such as ca-
ressing (Premack & Premack, 1997) or approaching (Kuhlmeier et
al., 2003). Even more impressive, 6- and 10-month-old infants
have been shown to prefer individuals who have demonstrated
helping behavior over an individual who has shown hindering
behavior, as demonstrated by their reaching and looking behavior
(Hamlin et al., 2007). In another study that examined the ability to
recognize the dispositions of others, Song, Baillargeon, and Fisher
(2005) found that 13-month-old infants expected that an actor
whom they had observed sliding various toys back and forth would
select a new toy that afforded the same sliding motion. These
findings suggest that infants can attribute a disposition to another
on the basis of their behavior in one situation and expect their new
behaviors to reflect that disposition.
In contrast to the findings described earlier, Kalish (2002) found
that preschoolers predicted complementary, rather than consistent,
behaviors in characters, for example, that someone who chose to
drink milk one time would later choose orange juice. Since this
study described only one instance of the behavior for children
before they had to make a prediction, it may not have tapped into
children’s understanding of dispositions or preferences. Children
may need to be presented with multiple instances of some behavior
or choice before they come to see it as something that will remain
consistent over time. In fact, recent research has shown that while
5- and 6-year-old children may make inferences about others from
a little as one instance of behavior, younger children require
several instances of behavior before inferring a trait (Boseovski &
Lee, 2006).
Do young children have a true understanding of traits and
dispositions, or could simpler reasoning processes account for
these findings? In many studies of children’s disposition under-
standing, behavioral predictions can be based simply on consis-
tency in actions over time, thus they may not require a true trait
inference (e.g. Cain, Heyman, & Walker, 1997). However, Hey-
man and Gelman (2000) found that 3- to 5-year-old children
preferentially used trait information over appearance information
when matching characters’ preferences and behaviors, suggesting
that children at this age see traits as internal characteristics, not
simply consistencies in behavior. In addition, as early as 5 years of
age children make different predictions for a character’s emotional
reaction to a situation on the basis of the character’s trait (Yuill &
Pearson, 1998).
Another proposed alternative explanation for the findings on
children’s trait understanding is that they may simply rely on
evaluative reasoning. That is, children may judge people as either
positive or negative and make other inferences based on that
valence (Ruble & Dweck, 1995). For example, 5- to 6-year-old
children were found to rely primarily on valence of traits, not traits
themselves, when making behavioral predictions about others (Al-
varez, Ruble, & Bolger, 2001). It may be that children initially rely
on valence as a general trait and only later build on that to
incorporate more subtle trait understanding.
At what point can children integrate all of these cognitive skills
to recognize the preference of another person as an underlying,
consistent mental state and not simply behavioral consistency or
general valence? From the described previously early abilities to
understand others’ emotions and desires as well as to recognize
behavioral consistencies, it appears that 2-year-old children are
likely capable of recognizing the preferences of others. That is, if
young children are presented with an agent who consistently
demonstrates a desire for a certain type of thing, they should
interpret it as a preference and not just a series of desires for
different things.
The ability to recognize a correspondence between one’s own
and another person’s preferences is an essential component of
learning to use social information to make sense of others’
thoughts and actions. In the present experiments, we examined
whether 2-year-old children recognize when another person’s pref-
erence matches their own and how this information guides their
actions. We incorporated into the experiments two methodological
changes designed to facilitate children’s understanding of consis-
tent preferences and dispositions earlier than previously observed
in similar studies (e.g., Kalish, 2002). First, the experiments were
designed such that children played an active role in choosing
between items, rather than being required to make explicit predic-
tions about other people. Second, children were shown multiple
instances of an individual’s preference-indicating behavior. Thus,
we predicted that children in the present study would demonstrate
an understanding of consistent preferences and dispositions earlier
than previously observed in similar studies. More specifically, we
predicted that 2-year-old children would be able to integrate in-
formation from an interaction with another individual and recog-
nize a possible shared preference between themselves and that
person. Detecting a shared preference should, in turn, have influ-
enced how children interpreted claims made by others about new
items.
Experiment 1
Do children form an impression of others’ preferences upon
observing multiple instances of an individual person’s desires and
actively use that knowledge to achieve their goals? In Experiment
1, we examined this issue by asking whether children are sensitive
to two actors’ contrasting toy preferences and use that knowledge
to inform their own decisions about unseen items offered by those
people. Specifically, if the child’s own preference matches that of
one of the actors and mismatches that of the other actor, will she
choose to receive toys from the actor whose preferences are more
consistent with her own?
In the present experiment, two actors introduce four pairs of fun
and boring toys to a child, with one actor displaying a preference
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for fun toys and the other displaying a preference for boring toys.1
In one test condition, children are then asked to choose between
new out-of-view items from the actors that are ostensibly each
actor’s favorite toy and book (favorite condition). If children detect
the shared preference with the individual whose preference
matched their own on the training trials and understand that this
preference generalizes to other items in that category, then they
should choose the favorite toy from the person who shared their
toy preference. In addition, if children extend the shared toy
preference to items in a related category, for example, books, they
should also choose the favorite book from the person who shared
their toy preference.
However, it is possible that children could form a positive
association with the actor who shares their preference, leading
children to choose items from her without requiring an understand-
ing of shared preference. As a control to verify an understanding
of preference, a second condition allows children to choose be-
tween toys and books that are unfamiliar to the actors (unfamiliar
condition). Here, if children realize that the actors’ preferences
have no bearing on how desirable an item is if the actors do not
know what the item is, they should not be biased to choose those
items from the actor who shares their preference. In a third con-
dition, children are asked to choose between items that the actors
can see but claim to dislike (dislike condition). This condition
focuses on children’s understanding that they cannot simply base
their decisions on the actors’ knowledge of an item without at-
tending to the content of the message that the individual is giving.
If children understand this, then they should not choose items from
the person who shares their preference when those items are
disliked.
Method
Participants. Participants were 144 children (65 girls, 79
boys) divided equally across the three conditions and two age
groups, resulting in 24 children in each condition per age: 23-
month-olds (mean age  23 months 4 days; range  from 21
months 2 days to 25 months 24 days) and 28-month-olds (mean
age  28 months 17 days; range  from 25 months 26 days to 30
months 26 days). Participants were recruited from a database of
families who expressed interest in participating in psychological
research with their children. The majority of children tested were
middle class and White (n  86), with the remainder of partici-
pants being Asian (29), Latino/a (22), or African American (7).
Eighteen additional 23-month-old children were excluded from the
analyses for refusal to complete the study (12), experimenter error
(1), or failure to display a clear preference for either toy category
during training, which precluded the development of a shared
preference with either actor (5). Eleven additional 28-month-old
children were excluded for refusal to complete the study (5), experi-
menter error (4), parental interference (1), or failure to display a clear
preference for either toy category during training (1).
Design. The experiment included a training phase, in which
children learned the toy preferences of two female actors, and a
test phase, in which children could apply their knowledge of the
actors’ preferences to new items. During the initial training phase,
two actors demonstrated their like and dislike for various toys,
with one actor demonstrating an overall preference that matched
that of the child (matching actor) and the other actor demonstrating
a preference that contrasted that of the child (mismatching actor).
Children were then tested on how they applied their knowledge of
the two actors’ preferences to new toys (same category) and books
(related category) on two test trials (one of each). Each child was
randomly assigned to one of three possible test conditions—
favorite, unfamiliar, or dislike—in which they were asked to
choose between items offered by the two actors (in open bags—
favorite and dislike conditions—or closed boxes—unfamiliar con-
dition).
Materials. Four pairs of toys were included in the training
portion of the experiment (see Figure 1). Each set was comprised
of a fun, interesting toy and a plain, boring toy that were matched
on at least one perceptual dimension (e.g. shape, material, cate-
gory). Each fun toy was more colorful than its boring counterpart
and in addition had an interesting function, such as having move-
able parts or making a noise. For example, one of the fun toys was
an orange and green baton with beads inside that made noise when
it was turned, and its boring counterpart was a plain black plastic
pipe. In the test trials of the favorite and dislike conditions, two
identical toys (small yellow ducks) and two books were each
enclosed inside a small opaque bag. The two test trial toys were
chosen to be neutral (neither very fun nor boring) so that children
did not receive strong positive or negative feedback for their
choice. It is important to note that the plain yellow duck could be
viewed as an item liked by either the matching or mismatching
actor, since it was brightly colored yet did not have an interesting
function. For the test trials of the unfamiliar condition, the same
two identical toys were each enclosed inside a small opaque box,
the two books were each concealed in an envelope, and each pair
(of toys or books) was placed inside a large opaque bag, such that
test items were not visible to the child or the two actors.
Procedure. There were two phases in the experiment: training
and test.
Training trials. The child was seated across from two female
actors. Parents sat in a chair behind the child and were asked to be
silent throughout the procedure. The two actors demonstrated their
opposite preferences during four training trials, such that one actor
consistently showed a preference for fun toys and the other for
boring toys. Each trial involved a pair of toys, including a more
colorful and interesting toy (fun), which the matching actor
claimed to like, and a more plain and boring toy (boring), which
the mismatching actor claimed to like. To begin each of the four
training trials, one actor removed the first toy in a pair from a large
box placed on the floor between the two actors’ chairs. The first
actor commented on the toy using facial expressions and three
statements about whether she liked or disliked the toy. For exam-
ple, while showing very positive facial emotion, the actor would
say in a happy, upbeat tone of voice, “Oh, what a nice toy. I really
like this one. This is a great toy.” In contrast, for the disliked toy,
the actor would show a facial expression of dislike, saying in a low
tone of voice, “I don’t like this one very much. This isn’t a fun toy.
No, I don’t like this one.”
The first actor then handed the toy to the second actor who
commented on it in the same manner but with the opposite reac-
tion—that is, demonstrating liking for the toys the first actor
1 Using a valence-based contrast of fun and boring toys was intended to
make the difference between the actors’ preferences salient for the children.
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disliked and dislike for the toys she liked. Next, the second actor
took the second toy of the pair out of the box, commented on it,
and gave it to the first actor who also commented on it. Actors then
gave a final comment on which toy they liked and did not like,
while taking hold of their liked toy. For example, “I don’t like that
one, but I like this one.” Finally, each actor played with her
favored toy for a few seconds, mirroring each other’s actions on
the toy (e.g., turning the baton or pipe back and forth in the air),
before handing both toys to the child. The child was then allowed
to explore the two toys briefly. The total amount of time each child
played with the toys was based on the child’s overall level of
interest in the toys. When the actors judged that the child appeared
to be satisfied with the toys, he or she was asked, “Would you like
to see some more toys?” The actors then put the pair of toys away
in order to begin the next trial.2 Children’s interest in each of the
two toys during this play period was later coded by two indepen-
dent coders in order to determine which toy in the pair each child
preferred.
Trials were counterbalanced for which actor retrieved a toy from
the box first. The order of presentation of the toy pairs was
counterbalanced across children using a Latin square. In addition,
the fun or boring toy preference role of each of the actors and
whether each test question was asked by the actor with the fun or
boring toy preference were counterbalanced across children.
Test trials. After the four training trials, there were two test
trials, which followed the same basic format across the three
conditions. In the favorite condition for the toy test question, each
actor retrieved a small opaque bag and said, “My favorite toy from
home is in here.” Then the actors asked the child to choose a toy
saying, “You can pick one of these toys to play with—my favorite
toy [Actor 1], or my favorite toy [Actor 2],” while displaying a
positive facial expression. After children chose a bag by pointing
to it or touching it, the other bag was removed from the table, and
children were allowed to retrieve the toy from inside and play with
it briefly. This was followed by a second test question, presented
with the same basic procedure in which the two actors each took
out a small opaque bag and said, “My favorite book from home is
in here.” Children were again asked to select a book in the same
manner described in the toy question.
In the unfamiliar condition, each test question began when one
actor retrieved a large bag and dumped out two small containers
(boxes for the toys and envelopes for the books). For each test
question, each actor picked up one of the small boxes/envelopes,
saying “I think there’s a toy/book in here, but I don’t know what
it is,” with a puzzled expression on her face. As in the favorite
condition, the actors asked children to choose one toy and book
from each pair, saying, “You can choose one of these toys/books
to play with—this one [Actor 1] or this one [Actor 2]”.
In the dislike condition, the test question procedure was identi-
cal to the favorite condition except that each actor claimed to
dislike the toy or book inside her bag, saying, “There’s a toy/book
in here, but I don’t like it,” while showing negative facial expres-
sions and speaking in a low tone of voice. Again, the actors asked
children to choose one toy and book from each pair, saying, “You
can choose one of these toys/books to play with—this one, that I
don’t like [Actor 1], or this one, that I don’t like [Actor 2].”
The toy trial always preceded the book trial, since the primary
question of the experiment was whether children would recognize
the shared toy preference between themselves and one of the actors
and choose the favorite toy of that actor. An extension of that
reasoning would be to choose a related item—a favorite book—
from that person as well. Therefore, the toy question preceded the
book question in order to check for children’s performance within
the category of toys prior to extending it to a different category.
Coding. Two independent coders rated children’s preference
for fun or boring toys while they played with the toys during the
training trials. The coders determined preference by subjectively
comparing the amount of time children interacted with and at-
tended to each toy. A preference for the fun toy was scored as 1;
a preference for the boring toy was scored as 0. If a child played
equally with the two toys during a trial, it was interpreted as no
preference for either the fun or boring toy and scored as 0.5. Coder
agreement was initially 85% for children’s toy preferences. All
disagreements between the two coders were resolved by having the
two coders discuss each disputed trial while viewing it together.
Five of the 144 children showed an overall preference for the
boring toys, and their test questions were coded so that choosing
favorite items from the person who preferred boring toys was the
correct answer. As noted earlier, children who showed no clear
preference, that is, a score of 2 out of 4 (e.g., liking two fun toys
and two boring toys), were excluded from subsequent analyses
since they did not establish a clear shared preference with either
actor. The first item (bag or envelope) a child touched was coded
as his or her choice in each test trial, unless the child touched
neither item, in which case the first item he or she pointed to was
coded as the child’s choice.
Two independent coders also rated the enthusiasm of the two
actors to ensure the actors were equally positive about the toys
they liked and equally negative about the toys they did not like,
2 The average amount of play with each pair of toys was 45 s (SD 
22 s) as coded from 25% of the participants’ training trials.
Figure 1. Pairs of fun toys (left side of each square) and boring toys (right
side of each square) used in training children on actors’ toy preferences.
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regardless of whether their preference was for the fun or boring
toys. Coders individually rated the actors’ behavior on each trial as
either equal in enthusiasm or rated one of the two actors as
exhibiting greater enthusiasm than the other. If the two coders
disagreed on a trial, they resolved the disagreement by discussion
while viewing the trial together. Initial coder agreement was 98%,
and after disagreements were resolved, the actors were found to
have equal enthusiasm on 100% of the trials. Two independent
coders also rated 25% of the test questions as to whether the
intensity of actors’ expressions of liking, unfamiliarity, and dis-
liking were equal or unequal. Initial coder agreement was 89%,
and actors were rated as having equal intensity of expressions on
93% of test questions after disagreements were resolved through
discussion as described earlier.
Results
The main question of interest was whether children would
choose the favorite toy of the actor who shared their preference. As
predicted, children selected the favorite toy of the matching actor
(79%). This pattern of choices was not observed when the children
were choosing unfamiliar (60%) or disliked (46%) toys (see Figure 2).
A second question was whether children would extend their shared
toy preference to a related category. Children tended to choose the
favorite book of the matching actor (73%), suggesting that they did
indeed make this generalization. Logistic regression was used to
examine whether children’s choices of items from the matching
actor varied across the conditions and across the type of item. In
the initial model, condition (favorite, unfamiliar, or dislike) and
item (toy or book) were used to predict the likelihood of children
choosing an item from the matching actor. This model revealed
that children were more likely to choose items from the matching
actor in the favorite condition than in either the unfamiliar condi-
tion (  1.04, Wald 2  10.77, p  .001) or the dislike
condition (  1.04, Wald 2  10.77, p  .001). However,
children were not more likely to choose toys than books from the
matching actor (  0.34, Wald 2  1.85, p  .17). A second
model, which included the additional predictors of child gender
and age group, revealed that the effect of condition held with the
new predictors added (unfamiliar condition:   1.04, Wald
2  10.79, p  .001; dislike condition:   1.05, Wald 2 
10.86, p  .001), and there were no significant effects for either
item (toy or book) (  0.34, Wald 2  1.86, p  .17), gender
(  0.38, Wald 2 0.02, p .88), or age (  0.34, Wald 2
1.80, p  .18).3 To further examine children’s choices across
conditions, we performed binomial tests to compare the mean
choices in each condition to chance (see Figure 2). In the favorite
condition, children chose toys and books from the matching actor
significantly more often than expected by chance (binomial p 
.001). However, in the unfamiliar and dislike conditions, chil-
dren’s choices between the two actors were random (binomial
ps  .10). Thus, children were most likely to choose an item from
the actor who shared their toy preference when that item was liked
by the actor.
Finally, to determine whether children generalized their ten-
dency to choose toys from the matching actor to their choice of
books, we performed a binomial test for each condition to compare
whether children who chose a toy from the matching actor were
also more likely to choose a book from the same actor. For the
favorite condition, children were highly likely to generalize from
toys to books: 30 of the 38 children (79%) who chose the matching
actor’s favorite toy also selected her favorite book (binomial p 
.0002). In the unfamiliar and dislike conditions, children were also
likely to choose a book from the matching actor after choosing her
toy; however, the results were not as strong. Specifically, in the
unfamiliar condition, 20 of 29 children (68%) chose the matching
actor’s book after choosing her toy (binomial p  .02), and in the
dislike condition, 17 of 26 children (65%) did so (binomial p 
.05). We found the same results when comparing the number of
children who chose from the same actor twice, whether it was the
matching or mismatching actor (favorite condition: 73%, binomial,
p  .0007; unfamiliar condition: 75%, binomial, p  .0002;
dislike condition: 65%, binomial p  .015).
Discussion
Children in both age groups tended to choose the favorite toys
of the actor who had shown a preference for the same toys as the
children earlier in the experiment. In contrast, when the toys being
offered were items that the actors were unfamiliar with or disliked,
children chose randomly between the two actors. These findings
suggest that 2-year-old children recognize a shared preference for
toys between themselves and another person and use that shared
preference to inform their choices of new, unseen items. In addi-
3 Interaction effects were not examined in the logistic regression because
the data from this study did not have enough power to support such
analyses. In addition, we did not have any a priori hypotheses that would


















Figure 2. Percentage of test trials on which children chose toys and books
from the actor who demonstrated a shared toy preference with the child
across the three conditions of Experiment 1. Children tended to choose
items from the actor who preferred the same toys as the child when the
items offered were the actors’ favorite toys or books. However, children
chose randomly when the items offered were unfamiliar or disliked by the
actors. Dashed line indicates chance (50%); errors bars indicate standard
error of the mean.
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tion, children are sensitive to the circumstances under which an
item is being offered, such that they only consider shared prefer-
ences as a useful source of information for favored, familiar items
but not for unfamiliar or disliked ones. Children’s random choices
for unfamiliar and disliked items rule out two alternative explana-
tions. Specifically, children were not making their choices based
on a positive association with the matching actor, since they were
not biased to choose her item in all three conditions. Second,
children were not biased to choose all items that the matching actor
was familiar with, since they chose randomly when the items were
visually available to but disliked by the actors.
It is interesting to note that children could have actually reversed
their choices in the dislike condition, rather than choosing ran-
domly, since they could have recalled that all of the items that they
themselves liked were items that the mismatching actor disliked,
leading them to select new disliked items from her as well. This
might suggest that children paid increased attention to positive
compared with negative preference information. If children were
primarily focused on the referents of the actors’ positive emotions,
they may not have encoded actors’ dislikes as completely as their
likes and thus been unable to recall that information later in the
study to inform their choices. In addition, it is not clear what adults
would infer in the same situation, thus it is difficult to determine
whether there is a “correct” response in this case.
The second major finding was that when children were pre-
sented with a second pair of items to choose from—two favorite,
unfamiliar, or disliked books—their choices followed the same
pattern observed in their toy choices. They chose favorite books
significantly more often from the actor who shared their toy
preference but did not show this bias for unfamiliar or disliked
books. This suggests that children may have expected the shared
toy preference to apply to books as well, inferring that someone
who liked the same toys as they did would also like the same
books. This generalization is reasonable since books are similar to
toys in that they could also be judged as either fun or boring. For
example, children might have thought that the actor who liked
boring toys would also like plain, boring books with few pictures,
whereas the actor who liked fun toys would like interesting books
with colorful pictures. Further support for this conclusion comes
from the finding that children’s choices of toys and books were
related in the favorite items condition, such that they tended to
choose favorite books from the matching actor after choosing her
favorite toy. However, an alternative explanation is that children
did not make a distinction between the two categories at all.
Perhaps children did not even recall the specific category of the
shared preference and only had a sense that they liked the same
kinds of things as the matching actor.
Unexpectedly, children’s choices across the two categories were
also found to be related in each control condition. Again, children
were more likely to choose a disliked or unfamiliar book from the
matching actor after choosing her toy. In the control conditions,
children had very little information on which to base their deci-
sions, since the shared preference was not necessarily relevant.
Thus, it is possible that children who were satisfied with the toy
they received from the matching actor (after randomly selecting it
from her in the first test question) decided to choose a book from
her as well, given the lack of other input on which to base their
decision.
These findings concerning the relatedness of children’s choices
of toys and books raise the question of the scope of children’s
reasoning process and their generalizations about shared prefer-
ences, in particular, whether children even consider the category of
a shared preference. While it might be logical for a child to infer
that someone who likes the same toys as she does will probably
also like the same books, it may not be logical to infer a shared
preference for foods or some other category of items unrelated to
toys. If children make such distinctions across unrelated catego-
ries, it would show that they reason about when it may or may not
be useful to generalize preferences.
It is important to note that a number of alternative explanations
could account for the pattern of findings observed across the three
conditions that do not require children to have an understanding of
preferences. First, children could have used a behavioral rule to
guide their choices. Whereas the unfamiliar and dislike conditions
of Experiment 1 rule out the possibility that children were using a
very simple behavioral rule that everything the matching actor is
associated with is good, it is possible that children learned a more
complex rule that the matching actor smiles when she sees a good
toy, thus if she smiles at something, it must be good.
Second, children could have used an evaluative model, such that
they viewed the matching actor more positively and thus chose
items that she liked. Again, the evaluative model is partially ruled
out by the findings in the unfamiliar and dislike conditions of the
present study, since children did not infer that all things associated
with the matching actor were positive, only items that she liked.
Finally, children could have reasoned that the matching actor was
a more reliable informant than the mismatching actor, such that
information from her was more useful in judging which items are
desirable. Each of these three alternative explanations predicts that
children will select any item that the matching actor likes. There-
fore, to rule out these possibilities, children would need to dem-
onstrate that they do not always choose items liked by the match-
ing actor.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to explore the scope of children’s
reasoning about shared preferences, as well as to rule out alterna-
tive explanations for the findings of Experiment 1. Children in
Experiment 2 were presented with the contrasting preferences of
two actors within one of two unrelated categories—foods or tele-
vision programs. These categories were selected because they
differ in critical ways, in particular, in how they are rated (i.e.,
foods are generally rated on the basis of taste, whereas television
shows are generally rated on the basis of entertainment value).
Thus, it is less likely that a shared preference for one would
reliably indicate a shared preference for the other. However, to our
knowledge, the question of whether children (or even adults)
reason about shared preferences in this way has not been empiri-
cally addressed.
The present experiment thus addressed the issue of how children
generalize information across categories. Research suggests that
by preschool age, children readily generalize factual information
across similar categories of things (e.g., from humans to dogs), but
not across highly discrepant categories (e.g., from humans to cars;
Gutheil, Vera, & Keil, 1998). Three- and 4-year-old children also
make generalizations about the extent of different individuals’
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knowledge across multiple domains, such that they expect a person
who consistently knows objects’ names to know those objects’
functions as well (Koenig & Harris, 2005). In addition, 13-month-
old infants have been shown to generalize object properties across
items with high, but not low, perceptual similarity, unless the low
similarity objects are labeled with the same word to indicate that
they are members of the same category (Graham, Kilbreath, &
Welder, 2004). Together, these findings suggest that young chil-
dren are capable of judging the similarity of objects across cate-
gories and making appropriate inferences on the basis of those
judgments.
As in Experiment 1, children in the current experiment ob-
served, over the course of four training trials, that one actor’s
preference (e.g., for foods) consistently matched their own pref-
erence and the other actor’s preference consistently mismatched
theirs. Following this initial preference training, children’s gener-
alization of the shared preference was tested on novel items liked
by each actor within the trained category (e.g., foods) and in a new,
unrelated category (e.g., television programs). If children reason
that a shared preference in one category is only informative within
that specific category, they should more readily apply the shared
preference to new items in the trained category compared with
items in the untrained category during the test trials. Because no
age differences were found in Experiment 1, only children from
the older age group were included in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants. Participants included 24 two-year-old children
(15 girls, 9 boys) (mean age 29 months 5 days, range from 25
months 24 days to 30 months 19 days). Participants were recruited
as in Experiment 1. The majority of the children were middle class
and White (15), with the remainder of participants being Asian (5),
Latino/a (2), African American (1), and Pacific Islander (1). Five
additional children were excluded from the analyses for refusing to
answer both test questions (4) or for experimenter error (1).
Design. The design of Experiment 2 is identical to that of
Experiment 1, with the exception that instead of observing two
actors demonstrate their preferences in the category of toys, half of
the children observed the two actors demonstrate their preferences
in the category of foods, while the other half observed the actors
demonstrate their television show preferences. Children were then
given test trials for both foods and television shows.
Materials. There were three phases in the experiment: intro-
duction, training, and test.
Introduction and training trials. Materials for the introduc-
tion and training trials included items from one of the two cate-
gories, foods or television shows, that children were expected to
like (i.e., desserts or child-oriented television shows) and dislike
(i.e., vegetables or adult-oriented television shows). This allowed
the matching actor to establish a shared preference with the child.
Specifically, for the food preference training trials, materials in-
cluded two plastic dinner plates and four realistic-looking replica
desserts (cookie, doughnut, lollipop, and cupcake) and vegetables
(cucumber, bell pepper, asparagus, and carrot). For the television
program preference training trials, materials included four pictures
from various child-oriented (fun) television programs (e.g., Bob
the Builder) and four pictures from various adult-oriented (boring)
television shows (e.g., evening news). Each picture was placed
inside one of two realistic-looking replica television sets con-
structed from black boxes with glass fronts. To ensure that children
would share a preference with the matching actor, prior to the
study, experimenters asked parents to choose four of the six
possible fun shows (Bob the Builder, Finding Nemo, Winnie the
Pooh, Blue’s Clues, Dora the Explorer, and Teletubbies) that they
believed their child liked most to be included in the training. In
addition, parents were asked if any of the five possible boring
television shows (golf tournament, evening news, Antiques Road-
show, weather, and a production of Hamlet) were liked by their
child. If a child did like a boring show, we eliminated that show
from the procedure, since it would not be construed as a “boring
show” by that particular child. Otherwise, four of the five boring
shows were chosen at random to be included in the four training
trials. Previous research has shown that by 2 years of age (and with
some methods even younger), toddlers understand the symbolic
relationship between toy models and their “real” counterparts
(Tomasello, Striano, & Rochat, 1999; Younger & Johnson, 2004).
Thus, we anticipated no problem with children comprehending the
use of “fake” foods and television sets in the present study and
treating them similarly to the toys used in Experiment 1.
Test trials. Test item materials were chosen to be neutral, as in
Experiment 1. To be clear, test items were neither strongly liked
nor disliked by children, such that when a child chose an item in
each test trial, they received neither strong positive nor negative
feedback for their choice. Specifically, for the food test question,
plastic fruits (apple and pear) were enclosed in each of two small
opaque bags. Fruit could be viewed as more similar to the desserts,
since they are sweet, or as more similar to the vegetables, since
they are healthy. Thus, the fruit test items were considered to be
neutral since it was plausible that they could be the favorite food
of either actor. For the television test question, the two additional
fun television shows that the parents reported that their child liked
least (but did not dislike) were used. Since these shows were not
children’s most favored, they were considered neutral and could be
viewed as being liked by either actor.
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, the child was seated across
from two female actors, and parents sat in a chair behind the child
and were asked to be silent throughout the procedure. Before the
first training trial, the two actors briefly introduced the child to the
category (foods or television shows) that the child would not
be trained on (untrained category) in order to expose the child to
the untrained category so that it would be somewhat familiar to the
child when items from this category appeared later in the test trials.
Specifically, children in the television training condition were
briefly shown a plate containing several of the replica foods and
told that they would have a chance to choose a snack later.
Children in the food training condition were briefly shown the two
replica television sets with no television show visible and told that
they would have a chance to choose a show later. Thus, children
were familiarized with the replica food or television items—
whichever category was not introduced on the training trials—
prior to testing.
Training trials. As in Experiment 1, the two actors demon-
strated their opposite preferences during four training trials, such
that the matching actor consistently showed a preference for fun
television shows and the mismatching actor, a preference for
boring shows (in the television training condition), or the matching
actor consistently showed a preference for desserts and the mis-
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matching actor for vegetables (in the food training condition).
Each training trial progressed in the same manner as in Experiment
1, except that instead of pairs of toys, pairs of television shows or
foods were revealed and commented on by the actors. For exam-
ple, in a television training trial, the two replica television sets
were revealed, each displaying a show, one fun (e.g., Bob the
Builder) and one boring (e.g., Hamlet). Each experimenter ex-
pressed her preference for one show. In a food training trial, two
replica food items, one dessert (e.g., cupcake) and one vegetable
(e.g., carrot) were revealed. Each experimenter expressed her
preference for one food item.
As in Experiment 1, we needed to establish that each child did
in fact share a preference with one actor. For the television training
condition, the parental report of children’s favorite shows was used
to ensure that the child liked the television shows that the matching
actor preferred. Since we did not collect parental reports for
children’s food preferences, at the end of each food training trial,
children were asked which of the two foods they preferred. This
allowed us to establish that the child indeed liked the same foods
as the matching actor.4
Test trials. We designed the test trials to examine whether
children recognized the shared preference within the trained cate-
gory (e.g., television shows) and whether they generalized it to the
untrained category (e.g., foods). For the television test trial, both
actors retrieved their televisions but kept the screens facing them-
selves so the child could not see the program. Each actor looked at
her television’s screen and said in an excited tone, “This is my
favorite show.” While displaying a positive facial expression, the
actors then asked the child to choose a show, saying, “You can
pick one of these shows to see—my favorite show [Actor 1], or my
favorite show [Actor 2].” After the child chose a television by
pointing to it or touching it, the other television was removed from
the table, and the chosen television was turned toward the child so
he or she could view it. The food test trial was identical to the
favorite toy test trial, with each actor claiming to have her “favorite
snack” enclosed in a small opaque bag and asking the child to
choose one and then giving the child the opportunity to play briefly
with the enclosed item. The order of test trials was counterbal-
anced with respect to which actor (matching or mismatching)
asked each question.
Coding. Children’s choices during test trials were coded as in
Experiment 1. Coder agreement for children’s choices was 100%.
Actor enthusiasm on training trials was also rated by two indepen-
dent coders as in Experiment 1. Initial coder agreement for enthu-
siasm was 94%. After all disagreements between coders were
resolved, they concluded that actor enthusiasm was equal on 99%
of trials. Finally, independent coders rated 33% of the test ques-
tions as to whether the intensity of actors’ expressions of liking
were equal or unequal. Initial coder agreement was 88%, and once
all disagreements were resolved, the coders agreed that the actors
showed equal intensity of expressions on 94% of test questions.
Results
Logistic regression revealed that children selected the favorite
items from the matching in the trained (88%) but not the untrained
(54%) category (see Figure 3). Thus, the main finding of Experi-
ment 1—that children reason about shared toy preferences and
choose new liked toys from someone who shares their prefer-
ence—was replicated for two new categories: foods and television
shows. The initial model predicted the likelihood of children
choosing the matching actor’s favorite item from whether the test
question was in the trained or untrained category. This model
showed that children were more likely to choose favorite items
from the matching actor when those items were in the trained
category (  1.78, Wald 2  5.77, p  .02). This finding
suggests that children do not indiscriminately choose liked items
from the matching actor. Rather, they seem to make distinctions
across categories of items such that they are less likely to choose
a favorite item of someone who shares their preference when that
item is in a very different category than that of the shared prefer-
ence. A second logistic regression model, which included the
additional predictors of child gender and trained category (televi-
sion or food), revealed that the effect of test question category
(trained or untrained) held with the addition of the new predictors
(  1.87, Wald 2  5.96, p  .02) and that there were no
significant effects for either gender (  0.42, Wald 2  0.31,
p  .58) or trained category (  1.07, Wald 2  2.06, p  .15).
To further examine children’s matching actor choices across
items, we performed binomial tests to compare mean choices of
the matching actor’s item to chance. Results revealed that children
chose items from the matching actor significantly above chance
when those items were in the trained category (binomial p  .007)
but not the untrained category (binomial p  .10). In addition, a
Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to compare choices of items in
the trained versus the untrained category from the matching actor.




































Figure 3. Percentage of test trials on which children chose favorite items
(foods and television shows) when they were in the trained versus the
untrained category from the actor who demonstrated a shared preference
with the child in Experiment 2. Children who were trained on actors’ food
preferences or television show preferences chose the favorite trained cat-
egory item of the matching actor more often than expected by chance and
more often than they chose her favorite untrained category item. Dashed
line indicates chance (50%); errors bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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In other words, we tested whether children were more likely to
choose a favorite item from the matching actor when the item was
in the trained than the untrained category. Children chose the
matching actor’s favorite item in the trained category item signif-
icantly more often than her favorite item in the untrained category
(Z  2.83, p  .005). These results suggest that children were
discriminating between items from the trained and untrained cat-
egories on test trials (see Figure 3).
Finally, to examine whether children generalized from their first
choice to their second, as was observed in Experiment 1, we
performed a binomial test to compare whether children were more
likely to choose the matching actor’s favorite item in the untrained
category after choosing her favorite item in the trained category. It
is important to note that unlike in Experiment 1, children were not
more likely to choose the matching actor’s favorite untrained
category item after choosing her favorite trained category item. In
fact, of the 21 children who chose the matching actor’s favorite
item for the trained category, only 13 (62%) chose from her again
for the untrained category (binomial p  .10).
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 2 suggest that 2-year-old children
discriminate across unrelated categories of items when considering
shared preferences, such that they do not universally trust the
opinion of someone with whom they share a preference. Children
who learned that they shared a preference for foods or television
programs with one actor tended to choose to see her favorite item
in that same category more often than expected by chance and
more often than they chose to see her favorite item in the other
category. Finally, unlike in Experiment 1 in which children who
initially chose the toy of the person who shared their toy prefer-
ence tended to choose her book afterward, children in Experiment
2 were not more likely to choose a favorite item in the untrained
category from the matching actor after choosing her item in the
trained category. Comparing these findings with those of Experi-
ment 1, we can rule out the possibility that children chose both
items from the same actor because of perseveration. In addition,
we can conclude that children are less likely to generalize a shared
preference across unrelated categories, such as foods and televi-
sion shows, than related ones, such as toys and books.
The results of Experiment 2 rule out a number of possible
alternative explanations for Experiment 1. Specifically, if chil-
dren’s choices in these experiments were based on a behavioral
rule (e.g., every time the matching actor smiles at something, it is
desirable), evaluative reasoning (e.g., everything the matching
actor likes is desirable), or reliability (e.g., the matching actor
knows what’s desirable), they would have been equally likely to
choose favorite items from the matching actor, regardless of the
category of their shared preference. However, this was not the
case. The current findings suggest that 2-year-old children display
discrimination about when to consider a shared preference for a
new liked item on the basis of the category of that item and do not
universally trust the opinion of someone who shares their prefer-
ence for one kind of thing.
General Discussion
The present findings show that children as young as 2 years of
age are capable of recognizing when their own preferences corre-
spond to those of another person and actively applying that un-
derstanding to new situations. To our knowledge, this is the first
study in which young children have been found to recognize
shared preferences and use this information in their everyday
reasoning, suggesting that children’s dispositional understanding
is far more sophisticated than previously thought. Experiment 1
showed that after interacting with two individuals with opposite
toy preferences, children recognized which person had a similar
preference to their own, such that when they were later asked to
choose between these two individuals’ favorite toys and books,
they tended to select the favorite item of the person who shared
their toy preference. This suggests that children inferred that the
favorite toy or book of someone who likes the same kinds of toys
would be a toy or book that they would find desirable.
When children were offered pairs of toys and books that the
actors were unfamiliar with or disliked, they chose randomly
between the two. This suggests that children understand that while
considering shared preferences may be useful when hearing about
a person’s favorite items, such shared preferences are not neces-
sarily informative for things that a person is unfamiliar with or
dislikes. This result rules out the possibility that children are
simply biased by a halo effect that prompts them to choose items
from one person on the basis of a positive association created by
the shared preference.
The findings of Experiment 2 revealed that 2-year-old children
also have the capacity to evaluate the relevance of a shared
preference in one category for an unrelated category. Here, chil-
dren chose favorite items from the actor who shared their prefer-
ence when those items were in the same category as the shared
preference (e.g., foods) but chose randomly between favorite items
in an unrelated category (e.g., television shows). It is important to
note that these results extend our original finding that children
select favorite toys from an individual who shares their preference
to two additional categories—foods and television shows. These
findings together with those of Experiment 1 indicate that children
have sophisticated notions about when it is and is not logical to
refer to a shared preference. Specifically, shared preferences may
be informative in the same or similar categories to the one origi-
nally established (e.g., toys and books) but not for categories that
are unrelated to the original shared preference (e.g., foods and
television shows). Children seem to understand that toys and books
are related enough that a shared preference in one can reliably
indicate a shared preference in the other (e.g., they can both be
rated as fun, colorful, and so on), while foods and television shows
are not (e.g., foods are rated on taste while television shows are
rated on excitement, humor, and so on). Thus, it appears that
children can combine their conceptual knowledge of categories to
inform their use of social information.
Given that children always chose items in the untrained category
after choosing in the trained category in Experiment 2, it could be
argued that children’s random choices of favorite items in the
untrained category might be due to memory limitations. That is,
they quickly forget who shared their preference and thus are
unable to use that information to guide their choice in the untrained
category. However, in Experiment 1, children always made their
choice of a book following their choice of a toy, and no such
decrease in choices from the matching actor was seen in those
results. Thus, it is unlikely that children quickly forget the shared
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preference and that that is the cause of their random choices in the
second test question on Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 also served to address several alternative expla-
nations for the findings of Experiment 1. Instead of recognizing the
two individuals’ preferences and realizing that only one was sim-
ilar to their own, children in Experiment 1 could have used a
behavioral rule that guided them to choose items toward which the
matching actor showed positive affect. A second alternative is that
children used evaluative reasoning to view everything that was
liked by the matching actor as desirable. While these explanations
could account for the results of Experiment 1, they cannot account
for children’s choices in Experiment 2. That is, children were
biased only to choose the favorite item of the actor who shared
their preference when that item was in the same category as the
shared preference. This finding suggests that children discrimi-
nated across categories of liked items and did not judge as desir-
able all items that the matching actor liked.
A third alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 1 is
that children were thinking of the individual who shared their
preference as a veridical, reliable viewer of the items and the other
individual as a faulty viewer. For example, Koenig and Harris
(2005) found that preschoolers recognize when an informant is
reliable or not and are more likely to trust the reliable informant.
If this was how children viewed the actors in the present experi-
ments, they would not have been demonstrating knowledge of the
subjective nature of preferences but only that individuals can give
either reliable or unreliable information about objects. However,
the findings of Experiment 2 suggest that this explanation is
unlikely—or at least that children are sensitive to the category for
which an individual is a reliable informant. Reliability can be
viewed as a consistent trait or disposition, much like a preference.
Thus, the primary difference between these two explanations is an
issue of whether children are considering the provided information
to be subjective (e.g., “You and I like the same things, so your
opinion is valuable to me”) or objective (e.g., “You know which
things are good, so your opinion is valuable to anyone”). Teasing
apart these two possibilities is a worthwhile area for future re-
search.
The present findings appear to contrast with those of studies
with older children, which have shown that preschoolers do not
expect consistency in others’ desires and actions (Kalish, 2002)
and do not use preferences in inferring others’ actions (Kalish &
Shiverick, 2004). In the present research, however, children did
expect that a person who liked a certain kind of thing (i.e., fun
toys) would continue to like that kind of thing, and they used their
knowledge of each individuals’ own preferences to make infer-
ences about that person (such as what kinds of things she would
find desirable). There are a number of reasons why children may
have shown greater success in the present studies. First, multiple
instances of salient behavior indicating each actors’ preference
were provided, giving children more evidence from which to infer
a consistent preference and to form their own judgments. Second,
children were actively involved in the test situation, making
choices that were personally relevant, which likely increased their
motivation to respond carefully on test trials. Finally, asking
children to make active choices is a more natural and less demand-
ing task, compared with requiring verbal judgments and predic-
tions. Together, these factors likely simplified the current task for
children, allowing them to exhibit their knowledge of others’
preferences.
Research on the development of preferences adds to our grow-
ing knowledge of children’s understanding of people as social and
intentional agents. Children’s knowledge of people’s preferences
builds on what they know about others’ desires, dispositions, and
behaviors. In order to recognize a preference, children must un-
derstand that other people can have specific desires that are con-
sistent over time and that individuals behave in accordance with
these desires. Understanding that preferences are a unique feature
of each individual is similar to understanding personal disposi-
tions, since dispositions are consistent within each person over
time but often differ across people.
The recognition of individuals’ dispositions has implications for
children’s social development as well. Coming to understand peo-
ple as unique individuals, some of whom are more or less similar
to oneself, allows one to make predictions about others’ behaviors,
opinions, and desires. Predictions can be made either by projec-
tion, whereby information about oneself is used to make an infer-
ence about another person, or by stereotyping, whereby informa-
tion about a group that that individual belongs to is used in making
inferences. Judgments of similarity likely play a role here, since
people are more likely to use projection with individuals who are
similar to themselves and stereotyping with individuals who are
dissimilar (Ames, 2004). Exploring children’s reasoning about
similarity to others should thus provide insight into how they form
expectations about individuals and also increase our knowledge of
the early roots of person perception.
In sum, the present study shows that by the third year of life,
children are capable of recognizing another’s preference, deter-
mining whether that preference matches their own, and using this
knowledge to make inferences about that person’s behavior to
guide their own decisions. Consequently, children use this infor-
mation in their goal-oriented behavior. This ability is quite sophis-
ticated and demonstrates children’s early developing capacity for
social–cognitive reasoning. Future research holds the promise of
enabling investigators to determine with more precision what
information children rely on to recognize the preferences of others,
their assumptions about how preferences should generalize across
categories and individuals, and how this might influence other
aspects of human social interaction.
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